On Systematizing

We like systems, they're convenient easy standards to which we can compare the world. Then, when we find points at which they do not work, we use those points as reasons to disregard to discard those systems. The problem is that no system can universally stand at all points of argument, so no system can withstand our onslaught if we wish to cast it off upon the slightest inconsistency. Yet, this is what is done in Western Philosophy, and I'm guilty of doing it myself (see my complain of Augustine's contradiction between his comments on Time and his comments on Free Will). I say this has been a problem within Western Philosophy but there have been some steps taken to move beyond this need for universalized/systematized understanding.

I'll point to a few, but first let me explain why this is a problem (beyond what was stated earlier). Let's start with Plato, in our insistance in taking the entirety of the Platonic Corpus as one system, we fail to take into account the natural growth of ideas. Philosophers, in some way, are concerned with being right (yes yes, I know there are plenty of points to disagree with here, but let's not get bogged down in the minutiae and miss the point). Let me personalize this and start using me as an example (and yeah, I guess I imply that I think I'm a philosopher, on whatever level). I think I'm right in a lot of things, but understand that I am not always right. If I come across a point that requires refinement of my thought, or perhaps complete negation and contradiction, then I will (usually) accept those given that the counterpoint comes with sufficient evidence.

I change. I can look back at the things I've said over the years and note the differences, and I'm ok with both the fact that I have changed and that I once thought such things. It's natural progression.

So why is it that I look at Plato and say "Dammit man, you can't throw a concept like the Good in because it causes issues with what you've established previously"? I think somewhere along the lines it was said "You didn't say that you were changing your system, so it's not an acceptable change," but, it's kind of difficult to simply state that you're changing your system when you're expressing philosophy via a dialogue. So we can point out the flaw of regress within the system, and sit in our haughty comfort without doing Plato justice.

So, is it fair to take the Socratic statements of Rationalism in the early dialogues and interpret the latter dialogues in the same context of the same rationalism? Or should the latter dialogues be taken for what they are, a change in thought (not just subject). We accept the change of thought in Wittgenstein as such (and he even went so far as to call Philosophy a disease!), we accept Schelling for what he is, why must we systematize anyone that doesn't either directly state they are changing, or make change so apparent that we understand a new train of thought has begun?

Mostly, because we (again) want our systems. But, apologies to Ockham, having one system to explain it all may be more elegant than having multiples, the single system doesn't work. It breaks down. So, perhaps we need to accept a bit of contradiction, I accept X in Y situation and A in B situation, even though X and A may contradict each other. Or am I becoming to Eastern?

On how to ruin interesting philosophy

God is a thought who makes crooked all that is straight.

-Nietzsche

Augustine, oh Augustine.

You start off with such an interesting topic, "time."

Seriously, I'm interested, time is just not that talked about, kind of like Solipsism. It's one of those interesting concepts to sit and think through, but the answer your come up with isn't going to alter your life; if you don't believe time exists, you're either going to continue living life as you did before or you go spend some time in a room with padded walls (this also applies to Solipsism and pluralism). Yet these questions may offer some epistemological benefit, for any serious inquiry on these lines must begin with "I" and "Experience," (thus advocating empiricism as base and primary) and reason outward from that point (thus advocating rationalism as secondary, but still essential).

It ends up as interesting philosophy. Of course one must contextualize the philosopher doing the questioning, Augustine in this wasn't familiar with modern scientific theory and the concept of non-linear time (as in moment to moment progression, not the historical "time is circular" argument, which Augustine would have been well versed in). The problem isn't the pre-modernity evidenced in Augustine, instead the problem is the same encountered in Aquinas, Descartes, and plenty of others throughout the years.

God got in the way of interesting philosophy.

I'm not saying god doesn't exist, nor that the question of god is not philosophically interesting in itself, instead I'm saying that creating philosophical systems predicated on the belief in god as base causes problems. Or rather, not even the belief in god, but the belief in specific attributes about god. Descartes, for instance, started of so nicely with "I know that I exist," but went horribly awry when he started building a system around the idea of a good or perfect god.

A first cause? Sure. An intelligent first cause? If you must. A perfect creator? Why? Was it necessary?

But before Descartes was talking about the goodness of god, Augustine was talking about the "omni"s of god (omnipresence, omniscience, omnipotence, etc). For god to be god for Augustine, he needed to exist outside of time.

He couldn't precede time, for that would imply a regress of time to which the earlier form of time god was subject, but Augustine doesn't actually adress this point, instead time started when god created. Time, for Augustine, is still infinite, but began when god created it. Meh, ok, I can deal with that.

God's relationship to time is where Augustine starts to lose himself. As the creator of time, god exists in full knowledge and experience of every point of eternity at once (which implies gods omniscience and omnipresence, the former Augustine touches on without directly naming in book XI, the latter Augustine doesn't address in this text). This eternal-experience-at-once-ness of god is interesting in light of god as creator. If god is experiencing/knowing every moment of eternity at once, then god knows every ramification of every trait placed into a creation.

Every action committed by every-everything is known at the point of creation. Which brings up the interesting question, "Does god know what ramifications specific changes to creation will have?" If no, the god is not omnipotent or omniscient. If yes, this implies a multiplicity of timelines. Further, this sets up a deterministic system, as every outcome is determined a priori.

But the point I'm most interested in is the conflict of Confessions Book XI with the text the publishers decided to offer right after it, a dialogue on free will. In the dialogue Augustine says God gives us free will and judges our eternal resting place on the actions we commit.

Wait, what?

God knew exactly what I was going to do from the first point of creation (since he experiences every point from eternity to eternity simultaneously), knew what certain changes to my psyche may have done* (or else he is not omniscient), and still punishes those that don't act according to his wishes?

God cannot be creator, all knowing, and judge and there be a system in which any entity other than god has free will.**

Moral of the story: Don't let god ruin interesting philosophy. Don't force a train or reasonable thought down some path to prove a point, instead let it go where it will.

*say the impulse to question everything were removed, I'd probably be a happy pew sitter

**Actually, this brings up a new paradox! If we define free will as the ability to do what one desires (and of course, the definition of free will falls into contention throughout philosophy), then can god create a system in which god is still creator, all knowing, and judge where there is free will of the created?